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Abstract
Wage dispersion had increased signi…cantly in developing countries, despite
the openness to trade of these economies. Research on this issue, using ap-
proaches valid under the assumption of conventional demand-supply compet-
itive framework, conclude that this observed increase in wage inequality is a
consequence of an increase in skills premium. In this paper we show that this
conclusion could be bias if governement intervention is not taken into account.
Here we …nd that in Uruguay most of the increase in wage dispersion could be
explain by a signi…cant increase in public wages and a decrease of minimum
wage. In addition, we observe that the the impact of these intervetions are
di¤erent depending on the degree of concentration of population and economic
activity.
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11.-INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades we can observe a movement towards greater wage inequality
simultaneously with an increasing oppeness to trade policy in most Latin American
countries. These are puzzling facts for conventional economic wisdom. The tradi-
tional Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that liberalization would raise the relative
price of developing countries’ abundant factor, unskilled labour, tending to reduce
wage inequality. However, evidence is the contrary, showing that the distance be-
tween the most skilled workers, as measured by the ninetieth quantile of the wage
distribution, and the least skilled workers, as measured by the tenth quantile of the
wage distribution, has been rising steadily during the last decades in most of these
countries (see Robbins, 1996).
The answer to this observed increase in wage inequality in an openning to trade
environment was found in the increasing in returns to skills. Most of the research
in this issue seek for an increase in relative demand for skilled workers that explain
the rising skills premium. On the one hand, the interpretation given to these de-
mand movements was that trade could have favoured direct investment in technolo-
gies skilled-labour-intensive in those sectors intensive in natural resources -usually
the tradable sectors in these countries. On the other, these demand movements were
s h o w nt ob el a r g e rt h a nt h ei m p o r t a n ts h i f t si nt h es u p p l yo fs k i l l e dw o r k e r s( s e e ,
among others, Mitnik, 2001; Arim and Zoppolo, 2000; Green et al., 2000; Beyer et.
al., 1999; Robins and Gindling, 1999; Robbins, 1996 ).
However, these results were obtained under the assumption of a competitive mar-
ket framework, ignoring the e¤ects of government intervention on labour market out-
comes. In this paper we suggest that in some Latin American countries, as in Uruguay,
the intervention in the labour market is crucial to explain the observed increase in
wage inequality, as well as its timing. Not neglecting that there has been some in-
2crease in skills premium, we …nd that collective wage bargainig or the public wage
policy seriously a¤ected the wage distribution.
Rising wage inequality in Uruguay was analyzed by a few number of papers, Gon-
zalez and Miles (2001), Azim and Zoppollo (2000) and Robbins, (1996). All these
papers begin their discussion with the prior belief that the explanation to the greater
wage dispersion is found in the increase in returns to skills (maybe following what
was the current research view) not taking into account the impact of the goverment
intervention in labour market outcomes. As a consequence, the conclusions of these
papers con…rm their priors. Nevertheless, if the government interventions are taken
into account conclusions can signi…cantly change.
The concern of these paper is to analyze the observed increase in wage dispersion
in Uruguay b e tween 1986 and 1997, the latest year
of available data, discussing the e¤ects of the intervention in the labour market.
Furthermore, to study these wage structure movements we will take into account
the regional di¤erences of concentration of population and economic activity that
characterizes developing countries.
In most empirical analysis of wage inequality, the labour market of a country is
considered homogeneous, i.e. at most regional di¤erences are only introduced by
dummy variables. However, an important di¤erence between developed and develop-
ing countries is that, in these last countries, only a few metropolitan areas concentrate
most of the population and economic activity of the whole country1. In particular, in
Uruguay, the metropolitan area of Montevideo concentrates nearly two thirds of the
economic activity and one half of Uruguayan population. The remaining population
and economic activity are dispersed in the rest of the country, basically, in small cities
1In the south cone of Latin America, nearly forty percent of the total country’s population lives in
the main metropolitan areas of Gran Buenos Aires, Argentina; Santiago, Chile; Asunción, Paraguay;
Lima, Perú (CEPAL, 1997).
32. We …nd that the wage structure movements were signi…cantly a¤ected by these
di¤erences in concentration of popultation and economic activity.
The paper is divided in …ve sections. In the next section we discuss the data used.
In section three we study the changes in the wage structure following a descriptive
approach. In section four we discuss the possible determinants of the observed increase
in wage inequality. In section …ve we conclude.
2.-DATA
The results presented in this study are based on men wage data of the Uruguayan
Household Survey from 1986 through 1997 (Encuesta de Hogares, Instituto Nacional
de Estadística, Uruguay). The survey frame is the civilian population of Uruguay
living in housing units in urban areas, decomposed in a survey for the metropolitan
area of Montevideo and another one for the population living in cities in the rest of
Uruguay -we will refer to this second survey as the rest of the urban zones (RUZ).
The sample we use is composed of all the males older than 13 years, given that this
is the legal working age in Uruguay. We only include those who had a positive salary
in the month preceding the interview, i.e. at least one month tenure, and who worked
during the week before the interview, either in the private or in the public sector (self-
employed, working without salary, entrepreneurs, or those who had never worked are
excluded). In Table A1 in the appendix we present the number of observations used
and some descriptive statistics of the main variables (see Buchelli et al. 2000, for a
detailed description of the survey).
The variable of interest is the real hourly wage, de…ned as the salary in the month
just before the interview divided by four times the hours worked in the week previous
23.2 million people live in Uruguay, 90 percent in cities: 45% in Montevideo; the rest dispersed
in cities generally smaller than 30.000 inhabitants (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Censo 1996
Uruguay).
4to the interview. We assume that the hours worked in the week previous to the
interview are the same for the whole month just before the interview (see DiNardo et
al., 1996, for a justi…cation of the use of real hourly wages).
In order to de…ne real wages we de‡ate hourly wages by the Montevidean consumer
price index, which is the only one available for Uruguay. Although the Uruguayan
expenditure survey, which is the one used in the construction of the price index, recov-
ers information of both regions -Montevideo and the RUZ- only data on Montevideo
is used in the construction of the consumer price index, based on the evidence that
in‡ation is similar in both regions. In this sense, the Montevidean price index is con-
sidered as the national price index and the in‡ation rate derived from this index is the
one used when bargaining nominal wages. That is, when bargaining nominal wage
increase in the RUZ, the measure of in‡ation used is the one based the Montevidean
price index. As a consequence, de‡ating RUZ wages based on the Montevidean price
index does not seem to bias the analysis of the evolution of the wage structure during
this period (see Rodriguez et al. 1998).
The surveys used do not account for data related with the union membership neither
on whether worker’s wage was bargained at a national, sector-wide or …rm speci…c
level. Hence, we will discuss the e¤ects of these elements on wage inequality based
on a descriptive approach.
Finally, we do not include in our analysis of wage structure the workers’ migration
decision, that could be a¤ecting wage di¤erentials between regions. Once more, the
data available in these surveys do not allow to formalize empirical equations for
migration decisions (Borjas, 1999). As a consequence, our results could be a¤ected
by a selectivity bias problem, i.e. there could be a pooling equilibria where all less
skilled-educated workers decide to stay in the RUZ whilst more skilled-educated to
migrate to Montevideo. Clearly, we do not know up to what the degree the lack
of including migration decisions a¤ects the results we discuss below, although in
5other papers, such as Rauch (1993), the self-selection bias was not signi…cant for the
problems similar as the one treated here3.
3.-REAL HOURLY WAGE CHANGES 1986-1997
In the top graphs of Figure 1 we present the median, tenth and ninetieth quantile
of the rhw distribution for working men in Montevideo and in the rest of the urban
zones (RUZ), as well as the minimum wage and unemployment indexed to be 100 in
1986.
Insert Figure 1
Overall, notice that mostly all workers experienced a rhw increase when considering
the two end points of this period, though these gains were not spread equally between
workers. Between 1986 and 1997, wages for workers at the tenth quantile of the wage
distribution, increased by about a 20 percent in Montevideo or a 2 percent in the rest
of the urban zones, while wages for workers at the ninetieth quantile, increased by
about a 70 percent or a 30 percent respectively. This divergence in earnings between
workers at the upper and lower end of the wage distribution suggets that there has
been an important increase in wage inequality, within and between regions.
Furthermore, there are notable di¤erences in the timing of these wage movements
along this period. Notice that only the Montevidean ninitieth quantile wage series
increased steadily from 1986 through 1997. The median and the tenth quantile in
Montevideo increased signi…cantly until 1989 and from 1989 through 1997, the median
shows a slight increase while the tenth quantile remained relatively constant until 1994
and then declines -the median increased by about 6 percent and the tenth quantile
fell a 10 percent between 1989 and 1997. In the RUZ, we observe the same pattern
3We could justify our …ndings assuming exogenous selection, which, as selection models, can not
be tested empirically (Manski, 1995).
6of wage increase until 1989 and from then, the ninetieth quantile remained relatively
constant while the median and tenth quantile declined steadly, a 13 and 25 percent
respectively. Wage inequality also increased between regions, as observed from the
bottom graph of Figure 1, which gives the ratio of rhw Montevidean to RUZ quantiles.
In sum, this discussion suggests that wage inequality has increased during this
period within and between both regions with notably di¤erences in the timing of the
wage movements.
The explanation given to this rising wage inequality by Gonzalez and Miles (2001),
applying quantile regression to a Mincer-type speci…cation or Arim and Zoppollo
(2000) or Robbins (1996), using the approach of Katz and Murphy (1992) to study
movements of the relative demand and supply of skills, was of an increase in returns
to skills. This same conclusion could be achieved if we apply the method proposed
by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce’s (1993) to decompose the increased wage inequality
between the individual characteristic changes, price of skill changes and changes in the
distribution of unobservable hability. Table 1 quanti…es the contribution of observed
quantities, prices and unobservables to the increase in the ninetieth-tenth quantile
di¤erential for the 1986-97 period, following directly Juhn’s et al. method.
Insert Table 1
From this table we observe that changes in prices of skills or unobserable hability
account for nearly 80 percent of the observed increase in the ninetieth-tenth wage
inequality in Montevideo and 65 percent in the RUZ. Furthermore, above the median
these factors explains an 80 and 85 percent in Montevideo and the RUZ respectively.
Below the median, in Montevideo a 75 percent is explained by change in prices and
unobservable, though most is due to unobservable, while in the RUZ these factors ex-
plain less than 40 percent. Hence, following these authors or the previous discussion,
these results could suggest an increase in returns to skills, if de…ned including observ-
7ables characteristics, such as education or experience, and unobservable habilities.
Nevertheless, the methods discussed above to infer an increase in skills premium are
constructed on assumptions supporting the conventional supply-demand frameworks
operating in competitive markets (Snower, 1999). These assumptions are not sustain-
able in Uruguay, where labour market outcomes during this period were drastically
a¤ected by the government intervention, such as centralized bargaining institutions,
statutory minimum wage changes or signi…cant real hourly wage increase for public
workers. Additionally, and related with statistical properties, robust results when ap-
plying Katz and Murphy or any other method based in separating in cells the sample
using observable characteristics, such as the Quantile Minimum Distance Estimatior
(Buchinski, 1994), requires a large number of observations within each cell (Peracchi,
2000). In other terms, given the relatively small number of observations on working
men in the Uruguayan labour market, these methods could lead to non robust results,
as shown, for example, by the changing signs of the eigenvalues when following Kats
and Murphy’s method to Uruguayan data.
4.-LABOUR MARKET INTERVENTION
Depending on government intervention, wage movements from 1986 through 1997
can be decomposed into two time intervals: a …rst interval, between 1986 and 1989,
where inequality remained relatively constant or even decrease, as in the RUZ, and a
second, begining in 1990, where wage inequality increased within and between regions.
Though these facts are clear from Figure 1, in Table 2 we quantify these changes by
giving inequality measures on the log in rhw in 1986, 1989 and 1997.
Insert Table 2
From 1986 to 1989, standard deviation and percentile di¤erentials remained practi-
cally constant or diminished. The most important characteristic of this period was the
8centralized wage bargaining negotiations that covered nearly 94 percent of Uruguayan
workers (see Rodriguez et al. 1998). From 1989 to 1997, wage inequality increased
signi…cantly in both regions, as shown by the rising standard deviation or percentile
di¤erential of the log rhw within these years. During this period, wage bargaining
drifted from totally centralized institutions to practically totally decentralized ne-
gotiations, a rising trade openning policy begun in 1990, public rhw increased and
statutory minimum wage decreased signi…cantly.
1986-89: Centralized Wage Bargaining
The …rst democratic administration, that lasted until 1989, was concerned with
diminishing social con‡ict and increasing real wage, particularly, for workers at the
lower quantiles of the wage distribution. Unions were legalized and wage-setting
process was based on collective bargaining agreements with an active government
participation that included extending the terms of collective bargaining contracts to
workers not initially covered by the agreements. The negotiations typically called for
sector-wide minimum wages and for criterias to index wage adjustment to past or
expected in‡ation, which was measured by the Montevidean price index. In addition,
this period was characterized by a high rate of unionization, which reached to four of
every ten workers in the labour market -traditionally, the ending periods of military
regimes are characterized by high participation rates in social movements (Rodriguez
et al., 1998; Cassoni et al, 1999).
The consequences of this intervention in the labour market are clearly observed in
F i g u r e2 ,w h e r ew ep r e s e n tt h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ei nl o gr w hb yq u a n t i l e .
Insert Figure 2
Notice that those most favoured by the centralized wage bargaining were workers
at the lower tail of the wage distribution, and particularly, workers at the RUZ.
9Furthermore, workers at all points of the wage distribution in the RUZ experience
rhw gains higher than workers in Montevideo.
On the one hand, this observations are in accordance with Rodrik (1999) results,
who suggest nonnegligible wage improvements from the enhancement of democratic
institutions. The centralized wage bargaining as well as the large number of short
term strikes that took place while wage negotiations -which demanded wage increase
for the least favoured workers during the military regime- explains most of the wage
structure movements over this period. On the other hand, these interventions suggest
that labour market forces were not e¤ective to determine wage levels during this
period.
The lack of e¤ectiveness of conventional demand and supply frameworks to explain
the wage movements during this period is more clearly understood when we observe
the e¤ects of the statutory minimum wage on the lower tail of the rhw distribution.
Though not mentioned before, perhaps the most striking fact of the top graphs
of Figure 1 is the dramatic fall of the statutory minimum wage. Between 1986 and
1989, the statutory minimum wage fell nearly a 12 percent, while the tenth quantile of
the real hourly wage distribution increased by more than 30 percent in both regions.
Obviously, if market forces had operated during this period one could have expected
a dramatic fall of the lower tail of the wage distribution, which will explain some
of the incrased wage inequality (Lee, 1999). The movement of the lower tail of the
wage distribution is explained by the fact that wage negotiations included setting a
minimum wage which was set above the statutory minimum. We will discuss the
statutory minimum wage e¤ects on the wage distribution in the following sections.
1990-97: Descentralization of bargaining and trade openness
The new administration that begun in 1990 adopted two decisions that could have
a¤ected labour market outcomes. The …rst decision was to completly descentralize
10wage bargaining institutions: between 1991 and 1997, wages of nearly 95 percent
of Uruguayan workers were bargained at …rm-speci…c levels - a radical change with
respect to the previous period (see Rodriguez et al.). The decentralization of wage
bargaining was accompanied by a sharp fall in the unionization rate, reaching at the
end of the period to only one of every ten workers.
The second decision adopted by this administration was to increase trade openning
policy, by diminishing tari¤ protections, even eliminating customs, as well as using
crawling-peg exchange rate policies so as to drive local in‡ation toward international
levels, i.e. in‡ation was nearly 115 percent in 1990 falling to a 20 percent in 1997.
The consolidation of the free trade commerce zone, Mercosur, took place during these
years, with a reorientation of trade ‡ow: in 1997, …fty percent of total Uruguayan
trade was with Argentina and Brazil; between 1990 and 1997, imports of manufac-
tured goods multiplied by 3 whilst exports by 1.5; the manufacturing participation
on the GDP fell from 26 to 20 percent, substituted by the increase in participation
of the service and tourism sectors.
Wage movements during this period can be observed in Figure 3, where we present
the percentage change in log rwh by quantile between 1989 and 1997.
Insert Figure 3
Overall, workers in the upper quantiles gained signi…cantly relative to the average
while workers in the lower quantiles lost signi…cantly relative to the average. Fur-
thermore, notice that workers in Montevideo gained signi…cantly more that workers
in the RUZ at the same quantile of the wage distribution. The striking fact is that
log rhw changes for workers in the extreme upper quantiles in the RUZ were smaller
than the mean changes of the log rhw in Montevideo.
In a wage bargainging and openning to trade environment, Figure 3 suggest that
rhw movements in Uruguay were similar to what was observed in most developing
11countries, where workers at the upper extreme of the wage distribution gained signif-
icantly more than workers at the lower end. Hence, if least skilled workers were to be
measured by those in lower quantiles while most skilled workers by those at the upper
quantiles, then we could possible argue that there has been an increase in returns to
skills.
However, if public wage and staturory minimum wage policies are taken into ac-
count, conclusions with respect to the reasons of the increase in wage dispersion could
be signi…cantly di¤erent. In Figure 4 we present the tenth and ninetieth quantile of
the rhw distribution for working men in Montevideo and in the rest of the urban
zones (RUZ), di¤erentiating public and private wages indexed to be 100 in 1989.
Insert Figure 4
In the …rst place, observe that in both regions public workers at the upper extreme
of the rhw distribution gained relatively more than private workers at the same point
of the wage distribution. In the second place, these gains were much higher in Monte-
video than in the RUZ. From 1989 to 1997, real hourly wages of Montevidean workers
at the ninetieth quantile increased by about a 65 and 21 percent in the public and
private sector respectively, while in the RUZ this increase was of nearly 15 percent for
public workers and a loss of 7 percent for private workers. These movements could
be the consequence of several reasons: a reduction in working hours without changes
in wages; high unionizaiton rates of public workers -which includes mayoralty, utility
and banking workers -; the fact that unions are particularly powerful in Montevideo,
where most of the public o¢ces and banks are installed -the dispersion of workers
in the RUZ diminish their union power-; in 1991, the Montevidean mayoralty was
gained by a left wing party which decided to increase public wages independently of
the workers category; mayoralties in the RUZ were much more poor in budget terms
than Montevideo; the utility industries -telephone and electricity- owned by the state
12and concentrated in Montevideo begun during these years a reestructuration process,
increasing signi…cantly their rhw.
In the third place, the movements of lower end of the wage distribution were rather
di¤erent between regions: in Montevideo remained relatively constant while in the
RUZ fell signi…cantly but only for private workers. In Montevideo, the tenth quantile
decreased only about a 10 percent in the public sector and 7 percent in the private
sector when comparing 1989 with 1997. Within this period, the public rhw movemets
in Montevideo were always below the private rhw momements. On the other hand, in
the RUZ, the lower tail of the wage distribution in the private sector, as measured by
the tenth quantile, fell steadily during the overall period -nearly a 25 percent decrease-
while the public rhw fell sligthly until 1991, and remained relatively constant until
the end of the period, e.g. the log rhw of the public sector decreased about 7 percent
between 1989 and 1997.
In sum, if inequality is measured by the movements of the ninetieth to tenth quantile
distance, then the upper tail of the wage distribution increased signi…cantly during
this period as a consequence of public rhw movements. In what respect to the lower
tail, it remained practically constant in Montevideo while in the RUZ it fell steadly
for private workers.
Clearly, the question that should be answered now is whether the increase of rhw
at the upper end of the wage distribution could be undestood as increase in skills
premium. Additionally, we analyze the di¤erent movements of the lower tail of the
wage distribution, arguing that it is basically a consequence of the externalities that
the concentration of workers and economic activity produces on bargained minimum
wages.
Increase in Skills Premium?.—
Results so far refer only to changes in the overall wage distribution and do not tell
13us how these changes break down into changes within and between groups. Within
speci…c groups de…ned in terms of observable characteristics, evidence could be some-
what di¤erent. Generally, skills are de…ned in terms of education and experience
observable characteristics as well as by the point in the wage distribution a worker
is within these groups, unobservable hability, i.e. workers at the tenth and nineti-
eth quantile in the same education-experience subgroup are commonly refered as low
skilled and more skilled respectively. In this sense, is undestood as an increase in
returns to skills if within more experienced-educated workers those in the upper ex-
treme of the wage distribution gain signi…cantly more than those at the lower end or
if more educated-experience workers enjoyed higher wage increase than less educated-
experienced workers.
In Figure 5 we plot the percentage change in log rhw by quantile between 1989 and
1997 for Montevideo, characterizing workers depending on whether they are public
or private workers, having 12 or less schooling years or more than 12 schooling years
a n dl e s st h a n1 0o rm o r et h a n1 0y e a r so fe x p e r i e n c e .
Insert Figure 5
Within groups, these graphs illustrate two facts. First, that rhw increased relatively
more for workers at the upper quantiles than for workers at the lower end of the wage
distribution. Therefore, in the sense discussed in the last paragraph, this could be
understood as if more skilled workers enjoyed higher log rhw increase than less skilled
workers. Second, that wage movements at the upper extreme of the wage distribution
were dominated by public wage movements. That is, more skilled public workers
enjoyed higher wage increments than more skilled private workers.
Between these groups, regularities are not so clear.In Table 3, were we summarize
log rhw rate of change.
Insert Table 3
14Notice that less educated-more experienced workers enjoyed a higher log rhw in-
crease than more educated-more experienced workers at most quantiles. Further-
more, less experienced-more educated public workers gained sligthly less than more
experienced-more educated workers. That is, these statistics show that there are no
clear regularities in the rhw movements with respect to observed characteristics, e.g.
rhw increase did not favoured more educated-experienced workers with respect to less
educated-experienced workers, as should be expected if wage policy favoured more
skilled workers as de…ned by observable characteristics.
Additionally, we had estimated the ratio of the nonparametric quantiles of the log
rhw conditional on education, between the public and private rhw. In other terms,
Table 4 present the ratio between the nonparametric quantile of the public sector
log rhw and the nonparametric quantile of the private sector log rhw, conditional on
having 6, 10, 12 or 16 years of schooling and less or more thant ten years of potential
experience.
Insert Table 4
The striking fact is that in all cases the ratio had increased and is larger than
one -except for workers with sixteen years of schooling and more than ten years of
experience in the ninetieth quantile of the log rhw distribution. That is, in 1997, rhw
for workers in each of these quantiles were sligthly higher in the public than in the
private sector. The fact that these ratio increased between 1989 and 1997 imply that
public wages at each quantile, conditional on the years of schooling and experience,
increased relatively more or decreased less in the public than in the private sector.
Therefore, for the case of Montevideo we do not observe clear regularities in the
wage movements in terms of workers skills. Nevertheless, what the discussion above
suggest is that the observed increase in wage inequality between 1989 and 1997 is
basically a consequence of the important increase public rhw.
15For the RUZ, the story is somewhat di¤erent, recalling the idea that dispersion of
economic activity and population could have a¤ected rhw movements. In Figure 6
we plot the percentage change in log rhw by quantile between 1989 and 1997 for the
RUZ.
Insert Figure 6
Within groups, a similarity with Montevideo is that rhw for workers at the upper
extreme of the wage distribution increased more or decreased less than for workers at
the lower end. Furthermore, between groups, more skilled workers, measured by the
more experience-educated, enjoyed higher wage increase than less skilled educated
workers, as measured by the other groups (see also Table 5). That is, it seems as
if there had been some regularity in the wage movements in the RUZ, with rhw of
more skilled workers increasing more or decreasing less than for less skilled workers.
This is the basic di¤erence with respect to Montevideo, and could suggest that the
high dispersion of economic activity and population in the RUZ could have a¤ected
these wage movements, by diminishing wage bargaining externalities at …rms or public
workers power.
Despite of these regularities in wage movement in the RUZ, what Figure 4 and the
graphs of Figure 6 suggest is, …rst, that the increase of wage inequality in the RUZ
is a consequence of the signi…cant fall of the private sector rhw, particularly in the
lower end of the distribution. Second, that again, wage movements on the upper tail
of the wage distribution were dominated by the public wage movements.
Insert Table 5
In Table 6 we present the ratio between the nonparametric quantile of the public
sector log rhw and the private sector the nonparametric quantile, conditional on
16having 6, 10, 12 or 16 years of schooling and for years 1989 and 1997.
Insert Table 6
As in Montevideo, this ratio had increased and is above one -except for workers
with sixteen years of schooling and more than ten years of experience in the ninetieth
quantile of the log rhw distribution. That is, in 1997, workers in each of these quantiles
gain sligthly more in the public than in the private sector. In the second place, these
ratio had increased between 1989 and 1997.
In sum, what we intended to show in this section was, …rst, that in Montevideo
public wages increased without clear regularities in terms of observable characteristics.
Second, that this regularities are more clearly observed in the RUZ, were workers and
economic activity is much more dispersed. Finally, suggest that in Montevideo, the
observed increase in wage inequality is basically a consequence of the movements of
the upper tail of the public wage distribution while in the RUZ is mostly a consequence
of the important fall of the lower tail of the private wage distribution, whic, as discuss
next, is directly linked to the fall of the statutory minimum wage.
Statutory Minimum Wage.—
As commented before, one of the most stricking facts of Figure 1 is the dramatic
fall of the legal minimum wage, a 55 percent over the whole period, of which nearly
80% corresponds to the 1990-97 interval. The impact of this fall in the lower tail of
the wage distribution, as represented by the tenth quantile, is signi…cantly di¤erent
between regions. While in Montevideo the lower tail of the wage distribution remained
practically constant, in the RUZ it fell steadily for private workers.
The Uruguayan minimum wage institutional framework is very simple: there is only
one statutory minimum wage set by the government and uniform for all workers. As is
well known, legal minimum wage laws were originally proposed as a tool to redistribute
income. However, in Uruguay and particularly in the nineties, the minimum wage
17was used as a policy instrument to diminish the public de…cit, since a large number
of government payments were indexed to the evolution of the minimum wage. This
explains the signi…cant fall in the statutory minimum wage.
In Montevideo, the movement of the lower tail of the wage distribution results from
a bargained minimum wage, at sector-wide or …rm level agreements, which were set
above the statutory minimum. The concentration of workers in Montevideo had an
externality e¤ect on the wage negotiations at …rm-speci…c levels. Those intervening
in the wage bargaining at sector-wide or …rm speci…c agreements realized that the
legal minimum wage lost e¤ectiveness due to its policy instrumentalization, and hence,
called for a bargained minimum above the statutory level. A similar phenomenon was
observed in Spain, where the unions’ aim in the bargaining process was to raise the
relative wage of unskilled and semi-skilled workers by setting a bargained minimum
wage much higher than the statutory minimum; or in the formal sector of the Mexican
labour market, where the legal minimum lost e¤ectiveness because it was too far to
the left of the wage distribution (Dolado et al., 1997; Bell, 1997).
The dispersion of workers in the RUZ gave the …rms a monopsony power when
bargaining wages, hence tending to reduce real hourly wages due to the fall of the
bottom ‡oor imposed by the minimum wage. This is in the line of what was observed
in developed countries, where the minimum wage acts as a bottom ‡oor of the wage
distribution, hence it movements a¤ects wage inequality. In Table 7 we present the
rate of change of unemployment between 1989 and 1997, of employment depending on
whether the worker has primary education or university education and the correlation
between unemployment and minimum wage changes with the momements of the
ninetieth and tenth rhw quantiles.
Insert Table 7
18Observe, …rst, the high correlation between the movements of the private sector
rhw tenth quantile in the RUZ an the statutory minimum wage, e.g. the lower tail
of the wage distribution followed the minimum wage fall. In Montevideo there is
practically no correlation between these variables. This suggests that the fall of the
real minimum wage pushed downwards the lower tail of the wage distribution for RUZ
private workers. This could be a consequence of the high dispersion of workers in the
RUZ, which increased the monopsony power of …rms when negotiating wages.
Second, there is also an important negative correlation between unemployment and
minimum wage and with the private tenth quantile, e.g. an increase in unemployemnt
was accompanied by minimum wage or tenth quantile wage decrease. In other terms,
market conditions seem to had a¤ected the lower tail of the wage distribution as well
as the statutory minimum wage.
Finally, observed that employment of workers with primary education had dimin-
ished in both regions, more signi…cantly in Montevideo. However, this decrease seems
to be compensated by the increase of employement of workers with University in a
similar amount. It looks as if there had been a substitution of workers in the labour
market. We discuss this argument in the next section.
Distribution of Employment.—
A ne x t e n d e di d e ab e h i n dt h eo b s e r v e di n c r e a s e di nw a g ei n e q u a l i t yi nd e v e l o p i n g
countries is that it is due to an increase in relative demand for most skilled workers.
However, this does not seem to be the case of Uruguayan labour market. On the one
hand, there is no clear evidence of a signi…cant increase in labour demand for more
skilled workers. On the other hand, there has been a noticeable increase of workers
with higher education in the labour market. To get an idea of the labour demand and
supply movements, in this section we brie‡y present the industrial and occupational
distribution of total employment over the 1986-1997 period.
19In Table 8 we present the total industry employment distribution, as well as di¤er-
entiated by years of schooling.
Insert Table 8
Observe, in the …rst place, that the only industries where the share of total employ-
ment had increased are construction, wholesale and retail sail, banking and profes-
sional sector and the educational sector. In Montevideo, the increase were signi…cant:
banking and professional services with an increase of nearly 3.3 percentual points; ed-
ucational sector, of about 5.2 percentual points; wholesale and retail sale with about
4 points. However, in the RUZ these increments were much more smaller, even prac-
tically insigni…cant in some sectors, e.g. the only industrial sector that signi…cantly
increased the share over the total is the aggregate of others. In the second place,
notice that the share of public administration on total employment had diminished
in both regions, particularly in the RUZ. Finally, when considering the distribution
of employment di¤erentiating by years of schooling, what is clear is that there has
been a dramatic change on the composition of employment, with an increase in the
participation of more educated workers. Notice that this change is general to every
industrial sector and not only to those that had increased their participation on the
share of total employment. That is, these facts could illustrate a substitution of less
educated workers by more educated workers without a change in the demand toward
more skilled-educated workers.
In order to obtain a picture of the employment supply changes, …rst we show, in
Table 9, the changes in schooling years of the male workers in Uruguay.
Insert Table 9
Overall, observe the signi…cant increase of the share of workers with more than 10
years of schooling, e.g. workers with pre-university and university studies practically
20duplicated their share in the labour market between 1986 and 1997. The composition
within this group is rather di¤erent between regions. While in Montevideo there
is a similar participation of pre-universitary and universitary workers in the labour
market, in the RUZ the relation is nearly of three to one.
In Table 10 we present the total occupational distribution of workers, as well as
divided by schooling years.
Insert Table 10
This table illustrates an increase in supply of educated workets within occupations
but with no drastic changes on the share of these di¤erent occupations. Again, it
looks as if less educated workers left the labour market and were substituted by most
educated workers in each of these occupations.
In sum, employment distribution does not show evidence of an increase of relavite
demand for most skilled workers. Instead, what this discussion suggest is that there
has been a reestructuration of the labour market with less educated workers substi-
tuted by more educated.
5.- CONCLUSION
In this paper we were concerned with studying the observed increased in wage
dispersion in Uruguay. The most common explanation given to the increase in wage
inequality in developing countries is an increase in the relative demand of most skilled
workers. However, in this paper we show that, in Uruguay, is the government inter-
vention that explains this increase in a large extent. Additionally, we observed that
the impact of this intervention is di¤erent depending on the degree of concentration
of population and economic activity.
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Figure 6TABLE 1: Observable and unobservable components of changes in inequality 1986-97.
Unobserved
Total Observed Observed Prices and
Differential Change Quantities Prices Quantities
Montevideo
90-10 0.3781 0.0816 0.1143 0.1822
90-50 0.2144 0.0412 0.0835 0.0898
50-10 0.1637 0.0405 0.0308 0.0924
RUZ
90-10 0.2445 0.0880 0.0266 0.1299
90-50 0.1302 0.0186 0.0375 0.0741
50-10 0.1143 0.0694 -0.0109 0.0558
Note: Based on Katz and Autor (1999) approximation.
1TABLE 2: Inequality measures for log real hourly wages.
1 9 8 61 9 8 91 9 9 7
Montevideo
St. Dev. 0.6642 0.6566 0.7807
Percentile differential:
90-10 1.5699 1.5843 1.9480
90-50 0.8842 0.9017 1.0986
50-10 0.6857 0.6826 0.8494
RUZ
St. Dev. 0.6418 0.5884 0.7029
Percentile differential:
90-10 1.4455 1.3998 1.6900
90-50 0.7035 0.6929 0.8337
50-10 0.7420 0.7029 0.8563
1TABLE 3: Montevideo Log RHW Quantile rate of change between 1989-97
Public Private
Schooling Years
+12 -12 +12 -12
More than ten years of experience
10th quantile -0.00 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03
25th quantile 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.01
50th quantile 0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.02
75th quantile 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.03
90th quantile 0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.03
Less than ten years of experience
10th quantile -0.02 -0.07 -0.00 -0.04
25th quantile 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.01
50th quantile 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.02
75th quantile 0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.00
90th quantile 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.02
1TABLE 4: Nonparametric Quantiles Ratio of Public to Private log RHW conditional on ed-
ucation.
Montevideo
Years of Less 10 years of experience
Schooling 10th Quantile 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 90th Quantile
1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997
6 1.146 1.122 1.114 1.136 1.091 1.106 1.071 1.096 1.051 1.111
10 1.151 1.110 1.119 1.117 1.087 1.093 1.065 1.073 1.059 1.081
12 1.142 1.112 1.121 1.104 1.084 1.085 1.065 1.066 1.069 1.064
16 1.135 1.075 1.112 1.097 1.081 1.071 1.053 1.031 1.034 1.075
More 10 years of experience
6 1.070 1.056 1.028 1.057 1.010 1.054 0.988 1.043 0.959 1.059
10 1.048 1.036 1.021 1.050 1.004 1.051 0.971 1.038 0.944 1.037
12 1.034 1.034 1.019 1.047 0.998 1.049 0.967 1.027 0.936 1.024
16 1.029 1.029 1.016 1.050 0.984 1.024 0.953 1.005 0.929 0.980
1TABLE 5: RUZ Log RHW Quantile rate of change between 1989-97
Public Private
Schooling Years
+12 -12 +12 -12
More than ten years of experience
10th quantile -0.10 -0.01 -0.00 -0.15
25th quantile -0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.11
50th quantile 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.07
75th quantile 0.03 0.03 0.12 -0.04
90th quantile 0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.02
Less than ten years of experience
10th quantile -0.07 -0.00 -0.11 -0.13
25th quantile -0.09 -0.07 -0.13 -0.11
50th quantile -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.08
75th quantile 0.04 -0.05 -0.14 -0.06
90th quantile 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03
1TABLE 6: Nonparametric Quantiles Ratio of Public to Private log RHW conditional on ed-
ucation.
Rest of the Urban Zones
Less 10 years of experience
6 1.211 1.396 1.125 1.206 1.070 1.100 1.059 1.076 1.042 1.101
10 1.200 1.309 1.121 1.173 1.069 1.085 1.065 1.060 1.041 1.091
12 1.206 1.300 1.110 1.158 1.064 1.082 1.054 1.059 1.040 1.087
16 1.181 1.289 1.092 1.152 1.052 1.062 1.048 1.047 1.027 1.078
More 10 years of experience
6 1.086 1.268 1.022 1.152 0.994 1.079 0.977 1.051 0.997 1.052
10 1.077 1.216 1.012 1.136 0.991 1.072 0.978 1.054 0.996 1.045
12 1.078 1.199 1.017 1.125 0.992 1.068 0.987 1.053 0.996 1.042
16 1.077 1.159 1.014 1.089 1.000 1.047 0.995 1.047 0.991 1.022
1TABLE 7: Legal Minimum Wage, Unemployment and Wage Distribution 1989-97.
Montevideo RUZ
1989-97 1989-97
Rate of Change Employment
Primary Education -25.0 -8.3
University Education 23.4 7.6
Correlation
Unenployment- Private Tenth Quantile RWH -0.73 -0.89
Unenployment- Minimum Wage -0.64 -0.83
Minimum Wage-Private Tenth Quantile RWH 0.10 0.93
1TABLE 8: Labour demand: industry employment distribution
Montevideo RUC
1986 1997 1986 1997
Manufacture 27.5 21.4 23.0 19.8
Low 18.4 14.1 19.4 16.6
Basic 9.1 7.3 3.6 3.2
Utilities 5.3 4.3 5.2 4.1
Construction 4.0 5.5 9.2 10.8
Wholesale and Retail Sale 15.2 19.0 13.4 14.3
Transport 9.7 9.0 8.9 6.4
Banking and Prof.Services 7.0 9.1 4.1 3.5
Public Admin 14.8 10.7 21.9 15.7
Others 16.5 21.1 14.2 25.5
By Years of Education
Montevideo
1986 1997
≤ 6 7-10 11-12 +12 ≤ 6 7-10 11-12 +12
Manufacture 44.2 39.6 10.2 6.0 28.2 42.1 19.4 10.2
Low 50.0 36.0 9.0 5.0 30.2 41.1 18.9 9.8
Basic 32.4 46.8 12.7 8.0 24.4 44.0 20.5 11.1
Utilities 38.1 36.4 13.6 11.9 20.2 34.1 22.1 23.6
Construction 63.0 29.3 2.8 5.0 49.2 31.2 12.0 7.5
Wholesale and Retail Sale 40.8 39.9 12.2 7.2 23.0 36.2 28.3 12.5
Transport 44.7 40.1 10.6 4.6 30.6 41.5 20.0 7.8
Banking and Prof.Services 14.1 40.9 26.2 18.8 9.9 26.0 27.1 37.0
Public Admin 36.8 38.0 8.7 16.5 23.0 28.8 19.1 29.0
Others 34.1 34.3 10.5 21.1 21.1 33.6 18.4 26.9
RUC
Manufacture 54.7 36.9 6.7 1.7 44.0 41.2 12.3 2.5
Low 56.2 35.3 6.8 1.7 46.8 39.3 12.0 2.0
Basic 46.5 45.5 6.6 1.5 29.5 51.3 14.1 5.1
Utilities 47.1 45.4 7.1 0.4 41.4 42.4 11.1 5.1
Construction 67.1 28.9 2.8 1.2 60.9 30.8 7.9 0.4
Wholesale and Retail Sale 47.8 44.1 6.6 1.5 32.9 43.0 21.5 2.6
Transport 53.0 41.0 4.8 1.2 45.7 36.5 15.9 1.9
Banking and Prof.Services 17.0 52.7 25.4 4.9 15.3 30.6 38.8 15.3
Public Admin 47.5 39.2 7.9 5.4 38.5 41.5 14.1 5.9
Others 47.0 30.3 9.6 13.2 36.0 34.1 17.5 12.3
Notr: RUZ: rest of the urban zones. ≤ 6: 6 or less years of schooling; 7-10: seven to ten
years of schooling; 11 to 12 years of schooling (pre-university); +12:more than 12 years of
schooling.
1TABLE 9: Working Men Schooling Distribution
Years of Schooling
6< 6-10 11-12 +12
Montevideo
1986 0.1171 0.6576 0.1131 0.1122
1989 0.1003 0.6473 0.1254 0.1270
1997 0.0557 0.5457 0.2119 0.1867
Rest Urban Zones
1986 0.2205 0.6626 0.0759 0.0411
1989 0.2016 0.6812 0.0804 0.0368
1997 0.1450 0.6616 0.1458 0.0476
1TABLE 10: Labour supply: occupation distribution
Montevideo RUZ
1986 1997 1986 1997
Profess.+Technic. 5.2 6.5 3.1 3.0
Education 1.2 1.9 1.1 1.2
Computer 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.1
Managers 2.7 5.0 1.4 1.8
Sales and Clerical 29.7 28.2 21.3 17.6
Workers and Services 58.0 53.7 70.5 64.6
OTHERS 2.3 3.8 2.6 11.7
By Years of Education
Montevideo
1986 1997
≤6 7-10 11-12 +12 ≤6 7-10 11-12 +12
Profess.+Technic. 7.5 16.0 8.8 67.7 3.2 11.1 11.4 74.3
Education 5.1 10.2 22.0 62.7 1.1 11.7 7.4 79.8
Computer 2.9 25.7 22.9 48.6 8.7 23.9 67.4
Managers 7.3 27.1 26.0 39.5 6.1 21.2 31.8 40.8
Sales and Clerical 18.1 46.0 21.7 14.2 11.0 34.1 33.4 21.5
Workers and Services 49.0 40.8 7.2 3.0 37.8 41.7 15.7 4.8
OTHERS 32.3 33.3 12.9 21.5 28.2 27.6 17.2 27.0
RUC
Profess.+Technic. 6.6 30.8 19.8 42.9 19.4 27.0 14.2 39.2
Education 0.0 26.1 18.8 55.1 4.9 14.8 23.0 57.4
Computer 0.0 33.3 0.0 66.7 50.0 50.0
Managers 6.9 43.1 38.9 11.1 15.1 34.9 32.6 17.4
Sales and Clerical 10.3 49.2 35.5 5.1 21.3 39.0 32.6 7.1
Workers and Services 23.4 36.4 39.2 1.0 48.9 39.2 10.3 1.6
OTHERS 26.1 26.1 44.3 3.5 63.1 27.6 7.6 1.8
Notr: RUZ: rest of the urban zones. ≤ 6: 6 or less years of schooling; 7-10: seven to ten
years of schooling; 11 to 12 years of schooling (pre-university); +12:more than 12 years of
schooling.
1